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Abstract
Since 1945, approximately half of the world’s states have been engaged in some type of
civil conflict. The aim of this research is to understand why some post-civil war states fail to
establish peace durability while others thrive. Through quantitative research of civil wars
globally and a qualitative analysis of Iraq, this thesis argues for the necessity of post-civil war
policy to focus on the renewal of domestic infrastructure in addition to military investment which
suppresses grievance-driven violence. A logistical regression model of all civil wars since 1945
shows that variables, such as healthcare, are evidently associated with more durable peace while
military has a positive relationship with re-engagement in civil war. Applying this research
through a policy recommendation, it is clear that, despite foreign involvement and the influence
of terrorism, favoring a rebuilding of domestic infrastructure rather than solely military
investment would be instrumental in establishing durable peace in states such as Iraq and many
others.
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Introduction
Since 1945, approximately half of the world’s states have been engaged in some type of
civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). It appears that conflict is ubiquitous throughout
history and inevitable in our future. But, it is possible to critically evaluate the various types of
rebellions and war resolutions that could help to facilitate peace. The study of civil conflict and
peace durability is essential not only because it can save lives, but also because it can prevent
future conflict and indirectly improve the lives and conditions of individuals around the world.
By understanding how peace durability after civil war is established, it effectively informs the
steps that government leaders take to rebuild and maintain their state after civil war. Each civil
war death reflects lives lost and the countless lives of others affected by that loss. When
reviewing recent armed conflict, one civil conflict may stand out more prominently than others
for many American and Iraqi citizens alike: Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Freedom
was a case that varied in terms of military and domestic infrastructure investment. Additionally,
the duration of this conflict, combined with the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant) that followed in the same geographic region brings special attention and need to evaluate
this case.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (renamed to Operation New Dawn in September 2010) was a
nine-year protracted armed conflict, also known as the Second Iraq War. In March 2003, the
United States invaded Iraq to overthrow the rule of Saddam Hussein and reducing the global
impact of terrorism. The United States’ enduring military involvement in Iraq not only created a
power vacuum by expelling land-controlling VNSAs (Violent Non-State Actors) and
systematically dismantling the Iraqi governments functionally capabilities, but it also situated the
United States to serve as a third-party to facilitate peace and democratic practices in the nation
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after war. These efforts were not without the assistance of the new American-appointed Iraqi
government. The budget expenditures of the new Iraqi government provide evidence that the
Iraqi government was assisting foreign military efforts to re-stabilize the state, establish peace,
and combat Violent Non-State Actors. According to the Inter-Agency Information and Analysis
Unit at the Joint Analysis Policy Unit, between 2004-2005 the New Iraqi Military (NIM)
received a budget increase of approximately 315% (2013). While NIM had a dramatic increase
in funds and resources, the outcome of freedom and democracy in Iraq saw no change (InterAgency Information and Analysis Unit at the Joint Analysis Policy Unit, 2013). The conditions
inside Iraq continued to decline during this time. In May 2005, according the Global Internal
Displacement database, Iraq had thousands of displaced persons and a lack of medical supplies
and aid as well as environmental concerns for families stranded in the desert (2019).
At first, one many be inclined to attribute Iraq’s inability to re-stabilize to presence of
insurgency alone. However, this argument can be quickly debunked as a U.S. military air strike
killed many prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda, but this did not aid or reassure re-stabilization of the
state, as will be evidenced later in this thesis. Rather, the influence of strategic investment
decisions affected the country’s ability to restabilize which may have provided the opportunity
for insurgency. Thus, after Iraq’s attempted stabilization post-Second Iraq War, allowed the
structural opportunity for terrorism to thrive. After ISIL captured the city of Mosul, the Iraqi
government was able to regain control in July of 2017. Although news outlets report that the
presence of ISIL is shrinking, military forces are still vigilant. As of March 2019, there are an
estimated 14,000 to 18,000 ISIL militants still occupying Iraq and Syria (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2019). Yet, as this thesis will argue, the investment strategies of Iraq indicate that
the country may not be approaching stabilization despite the defeat of ISIL. Thus, a question
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which prompted the following research is: if it was not terrorism causing the instability in Iraq,
then what occurs in the post-civil conflict reconstruction process that results in a lack of durable
peace?
While this question drives the research, it is important to note that each civil war is a
special case that has unique factors which distinguish it from others. Operation Iraqi Freedom is
no exception and it should be addressed according to specific events which contributed to its lack
of durable peace. This is evident in Iraq’s distinctive history and the destructive process of deBa’athification the country encountered following the United States influence. After deBa’athification, a primary element of attempted stabilization during the Iraq War that stood out
was the continued investment in NIM and military resources without fortification of domestic
infrastructure. A fortification of infrastructure, in this paper, will refer to a more equal
investment in domestic infrastructure as compared to military. Historically, post-civil war
investment as has been particularly advantageous for the military. As the following thesis will
discuss, the military investment and healthcare investment increased or decreased in equal parts
despite increased fighting and needs for medical aid for most of 2003-2014. Investment in NIM
continued to rise while the lives of individuals were still in disrepair. In 2009, when the United
States began to withdraw troops there were still active attacks and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) being used to target schools and students (Global Coalition to Protect Education from
Attack, 2018).
Initially, it may appear shocking that military investment was unable to yield more
promising results in Iraq. Logically, one expects that the short-term mitigation of violence due to
increased security to also be applicable in the long-run. Yet, the disappointing outcome of nondurable peace may be expected given further investigation. If there is disproportionate
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investment in military (or unequal investment in domestic infrastructure and military that does
not reflect the country’s needs), such was the case for NIM, then the individuals of a country are
still experiencing the same grievances that drove them to war in the first place. Regardless of the
number of boots on the ground or the advanced weaponry of the troops, soldiers are unable to
teach children or provide economic prosperity to the citizens feeling the effects of civil war. If
their government is unable to win the hearts and minds of the people, then likewise, they will be
unable to re-stabilize the state. It seems unlikely that a government which cannot provide its
citizens with resources for the prospect of a decent life is likely to transition out of the power
vacuum formed because the insurgency may be filling the gaps of resources that the government
is not providing. For example, according to the European Institute of Peace, many individuals
associated with terrorist group al-Shabab are largely involved for economic reasons in addition
to the feelings of belonging and responsibility which accompany it (2018).
The notion that post-civil war peace durability is best established when military and
domestic infrastructure increases in at least equal parts does not exclude the fact that safety and
protection of a state’s people is an essential element to being able to acquire resources to rebuild
their life and their family. The military, in many instances, can be the driving force that does just
that. The thesis does suggest, however, that states which invest a higher percentage of their
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in domestic infrastructure alongside military investment will
achieve a more durable peace after the civil war has ended. Similarly, the works of Badran
(2014) establish that well-constructed peace agreements are, in fact, more useful than solely
military victories. This suggests, at minimum, the negotiation by states and citizens for goods
and services beyond what the military can provide is an essential component of durable peace.
Military victories permit control of the people on the non-winning side by the winning coalition,
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creating dramatic asymmetries in power that increase the likelihood of retaliation in normal
conflict let alone civil conflict which may already be driven by a power imbalance (Badran,
2014). The size of the winning coalition is statistically significant regarding its impact on peace
durability in post-civil war states because the larger the size of the winning coalition the more
individuals there are who are likely to be in agreement on how to proceed in state rebuilding,
even if the rebuilding does not reflect equality or equity in distribution on rights and resources.
Thus, the following thesis argues that winning the hearts and minds of citizens through
establishing long term peace may be more important than originally considered by conflict and
peace scholars. Since peace can be established non-violently, as it often is with the influence of
the United Nations, the best way to achieve the desired long-term peace may be through aid
such as domestic infrastructure fortification.
This thesis proceeds in four distinct chapters to assist the argument that states who invest
a higher percentage of their GDP in domestic infrastructure alongside military investment will
achieve a more durable peace after civil war. First, there is a discussion of the context and
literature regarding civil war, military investment, domestic infrastructure investment, and peace
durability. Secondly, there is a macro-level statistical analysis and quantitative investigation of
all civil conflict post-1945. It will evaluate the correlation of peace durability to percentages of
military and domestic infrastructure investment while controlling for time after a state was no
longer engaged in civil conflict. Thirdly, there is a qualitative analysis of how the conclusions
drawn in the quantitative chapter may be applied directly to Iraq. Lastly, there will be a brief
policy brief regarding Iraq War which considers which factors set it apart from other civil
conflict, the global implication of this information, drawbacks, and how the state should proceed
in rebuilding.
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Literature Review & Rationale
Context: Civil War
Civil war is multifaceted phenomenon comprising of several different definitions, ways
to measure it, and factors that directly affect it. Regan (1996), for example, defines civil war or
intrastate conflict as sustained combat between groups within state boundaries with at least 200
fatalities. However, many researchers argue that this threshold is too high and will not record
events such as coups, riots, and other demonstrations symbolizing a conflict within the state. For
the sake of this research the definition used is 25 or more battle related death according with the
UCDP/PRIO Dataset (Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2018). Furthermore, whether a state is
engaged in coups, riots, demonstrations or civil war, military and domestic infrastructure can
contribute in differing capacities to the onset and reduction of these violences. Domestic
infrastructure-related influence may include factors such as education, healthcare, religious
polarization, systemic democratic processes and in many cases a hybrid combination of these
factors. For example, Reynal-Querol (2002) suggests that there is a positive correlation between
religious polarization and the onset of civil war. It is also important to notice that religious
polarization, specifically, can be seen to have a positive significant correlation with civil war,
whereas religious fragmentation is not of statistical significance (Reynal-Querol, 2002).
Polarization is related to the intensity of belief that one holds in opposition to others whereas
fragmentation pertains to the proportions of different types of religious individuals living in
proximity to another. Yet, it is also possible to believe that some of this religious polarization
may be attributed to a lack of systemic democratic processes (a factor of domestic infrastructure)
prohibiting expression or lack of educational systems promoting conflict resolution. Thus, in the
same way that military and domestic infrastructure influence on civil war are intertwined, so are
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the factors of domestic infrastructure intertwined on themselves. Governmental investment in
education is thought to have a dramatic impact on reducing religious polarization and increasing
conflict resolution skills (Abu-Nimer & Nasser, 2017). The presence of highly-funded education
systems with curricula that meets the global standard of education is shown to possess a negative
correlation to the onset of civil war. These domestic infrastructure-related factors will be disused
in further detail in the below paragraphs.
Another consideration that is seen to be influential in civil war is the vague notion of the
inclusiveness of the political system (Reynal-Querol, 2005). Inclusiveness of the political system
can be thought of in terms of how much the political system allows equity between voices. This
has been especially significant when measuring ethnic civil wars or countries engaged in war
while experiencing reinforcing cleavages. Depending on whether a country and its citizens feel
as though they are being heard contributes to how the government is viewed by those citizens.
This type of understanding could, then, potentially relate to post-civil war peace durability since
a state’s citizenry may not be inclined to invest themselves in peace building if they feel as
though the government officials do not perceive their concerns as legitimate
The above explains specific outside factors which contribute to the development of civil
war. The following paragraphs, however, will analyze what motivates individuals to turn to civil
war as a solution to their grievances. When analyzing peace durability post-civil war, it is
important to look at what the causes of civil war are because this what may be leading to the reengagement in civil war or a lack of durable peace. Attempting to explain the overall cause or
motivation for civil war leads two primary theories: the greed and the grievance model. The
greed model is when combatants are motivated by the goal of advancing their own situation and
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self-enrichment (DeRouen, Jr. and DeRouen, 2014). The grievance model is conflict motivated
by ethnicity, religion and socio-economics (DeRouen, Jr. and DeRouen, 2014).
The greed model is driven by the desire for private gains and is an excellent incentive for
rebel leaders to stage rebellions (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) argue that when rebellions are expected bring about tangible benefits, the possibility of
war increases. The greed model of civil war can be thought of in contrast to the grievance model,
which will be a primary theory relied upon in this thesis. The grievance model suggests civil war
is brought about by unresolved grievances. In ethno-religious conflicts, elites are often able to
persuade masses to rise up violently because individuals have a cause that they are directly
involved in and passionate for (Gurr, 1993). Typically, many ethno-religious tensions have been
in existence for substantial amounts of time, so leaders are able to mobilize these groups
predicated upon these traditionally-entrenched grievances. Through further exploration by
evaluating regional breakdowns of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at Peace Research
Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO database) and World Bank, it is revealed that civil wars are more
common in regions with higher poverty rates such as countries in Africa and Asia. In these cases,
inequitable distribution of resources may encourage individuals to use civil war as to express or
solve their severe grievances (2018). Alternative indirect motivations such as the rise of a
tyrannical leader or new government policy that sharply discriminates against one group may
also convert frustration to violence. Gurr (1993) concluded that grievances cause ethno-religious
civil war through using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database. Agreeing with the conclusions of
Gurr (1993), which states that ethno-religious wars are caused by external factors acting on
already-present inequalities, Banton (1983) suggests that this manipulation by elites to mobilize
the masses is especially likely in ethno-religious war.
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Military
Military investment may encompass many different mechanisms ranging from the
number of soldiers to the number of weapons. This does not exclude military technology,
military presence and allies; each of these factors can contribute to civil war in varying
capacities. Investment in military, which may be analyzed in different ways such as the size of
the coalition, the size of the military, and the advancement of the military’s weapons all play a
crucial part in re-establishing peace. The below paragraphs explore how the military’s
involvement and state’s subsequent investment in military affect peace durability.
One of the main elements of military investment that is more easily measured is the size
of the coalition or the amount of military personnel. The size of the coalition is how many
individuals in a particular country or defined area are siding with a political group or
organization. There are wide-ranging influences that the coalition force can have since a large
military force often occurs in the presence of other attributing factors such as another, possibly
opposing strong military force and civil unrest. This is because the more individuals that are
members of the military, the more monetary investment there is to compensate the soldiers and
supply them each equally as well. Additionally, when talking about the settlement post-civil war,
Joshi (2013) found that among several different military-related factors, the size of winningcoalition in civil war had a statistically significant impact on peace durability, regardless of other
military or domestic infrastructure-related security variables. This means that if the side which
one civil war was large, this would positive impact how long the peace lasted. This is most likely
due to the idea that, as mentioned above, there are more individuals to side with the government
in power and there are then more or a majority of individuals to agree with the policy being put
in place. Soldiers are fundamental to the capacity of a military and thus a large military may also
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be equipped with an intense military force. This is important to recognize because large military
forces may serve as a precursor for other public and private benefits. An example would be
increased protection in certain areas. On the other hand, military strength may not be beneficial
to everyone as it can serve as a limitation for insurgents attempting to gain control because rebels
must first have enough strength to challenge government control before they are able to provide
the military strength or collective goods comparable with what the government was providing
(Wood, 2014). Alternative research suggests that while investment in military may be considered
beneficial, there still are alternative incentivizing factors to balance military strength such as
security and access to parallel governance systems that would also encourage loyalty and
recruitment (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2004). Since the size of the coalition is significant, this
suggests that when terrorism has presence in civil war, the government may be more likely to
take different routes, such as economic intervention, rather than military intervention to fight the
opposing side (Butcher, 2016). Economic intervention may be a plausible solution for many
governments not wanting to intervene militarily because research suggests that greater military
troops and advanced technologies increase the capability of destruction, but they do not
independently create the incentive structure for violence (Wood, 2014).
Heger (2017) addresses the impact of coalition from another perspective by tracing the
negative relation of the size of the winning coalition to the intensity of war. The size of the
winning coalition is different from peace durability in itself, but it is related in that it affects war.
Therefore, understanding what drives the civil war may lend insight into what will need to be
addressed or should be considered during peacetime in order to smooth over grievances for a
sustainable amount of time. Heger (2017) hypothesizes the reason for the relationship between a
large winning coalition and low intensity war is the provision of public goods. This is because as

16

the size of the coalition increases, they can provide more public goods, such as affordable
healthcare, food, and education, as opposed to private goods (which tended to have higher
prices) to the citizens (Heger, 2017). Government-provided goods are preferred by the citizens
for the relative inexpensiveness and efficiency of the good and, therefore, when individuals are
receiving the goods that they need at an attainable price, the intensity of the war diminishes. The
mutually beneficial relationship between the winning coalition leaders and followers creates
loyalty and support.
Lastly, alliances in civil war are also a telling factor in relation to military investment. As
alliances continue to form throughout civil war, it appears that they generally aggravate violence
regardless of cross-cutting or reinforcing cleavages in society (Weidmann, 2014). This sheds
light upon what the root causes are of war in countries that are ethnically or religiously divided.
In such instances, increased violence can be attributed to the presence of alliances rather than
shared territory.
Domestic Infrastructure
While there is an unquestionable argument that military presence impacts civil war and
can help reduce its intensity in certain cases, there is also convincing evidence for the presence
of non-military related factors or domestic infrastructure. Not only are aspects of domestic
infrastructure intertwined within the military aspects, but they also have independent direct
effects on the outcomes of the civil war. Domestic infrastructure influences regarding civil war
can include a wide variety of developing situations such as economic intervention, wealth,
healthcare, elections, education, threats to democracy, and other non-military threats to
wellbeing.
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A main domestic infrastructure-related effect on civil war is economic intervention by the
government. Recent studies support the effectiveness and influence of domestic infrastructure on
civil war by showing that if military intervention is not a viable option, then many governments
may rely on the use of economic intervention to attempt to win the war (Butcher, 2016).
Realizing the different and effective ways to combat an opposition are important especially when
considering the necessity of assimilation of the opposing side back into the state after the war.
Thus, economics also plays a large role in civil war. During election time, incumbent
government officials fear that they may lose access to main sources of revenue, such as oil, if
they do not secure their spot again, so this may influence the tension and alliances formed during
this period (Martel 2016).
In addition to wealth, another contributing domestic infrastructure-related factor to civil
war is the attempted establishment or threat of democracy. Another perspective on Martel (2016)
shows that elections intended to be democratic may, in reality, be corrupt if the voters are under
pressure or threat. In a study which evaluated the presence of UN (United Nations) peacekeepers
in civil conflict nations found that countries with UN peacekeepers were more able to establish
democratic voting practices (Joshi, 2013). These practices were essential to durable peace
because it allowed all parties to express their sentiments and stances on individual leaders and
policies. (Joshi, 2013). However, these results should be understood while taking into account
that UN peacekeepers have a certain level of political legitimacy because they are backed by
international support which may influence how their democratic processes are interpreted (Joshi,
2013). Additionally, Joshi (2013) finds that the establishment of democracy was one of the best
methods to ensure the survival of peace and suggests that the presence of United Nations
peacekeeping force played a crucial role. This is significant because the non-violent nature of the
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UN supports that notion that military power may not be a required component of peace
durability.
Education has a large impact on civil war and the subsequent peace durability as well.
While public school systems serve as a great place to distribute propaganda and teach
nationalistic pride, they also serve many different purposes in relation to peace durability.
Specifically, there has been much success in incorporating peace education into schools in the
Middle East. Designed intervention plans focusing on incorporating conflict resolution into the
curriculum were implemented in various schools and Quranic schools. The students and teachers
participated in workshops emphasizing the necessity of empathy and conflict management. The
teachers and students felt more equipped and inclined to handle conflict peacefully (Abu-Nimer
& Nasser, 2017). In another example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of the world’s
leading countries in human development, recently prioritized the necessity of education. In 1970,
only approximately 48% of their citizens were literate. Today their literacy rate is approximately
93% with near equality between men and women (Crown Prince Court). This is due in no small
part to the UAE developing a new education plan for all the emirates and each one unique to the
different groups of people inside of the respective emirates. These regional differences can be
accounted for in the case of the UAE, but there are clear challenges to using education to have a
positive impact on peace durability. Attempting to come up with a unique and different plan for
every school in each region, considering that schools and populations may vary widely from one
small region to the next is extremely difficulty and time consuming (Abu-Nimer & Nasser,
2017). Additionally, acquiring the resources may be another potential challenge. However, these
drawbacks are not to discount the positive impact that education has in the role of civil conflict
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and peace durability. Overall, increased government funding towards education should be able to
make up for the amount of time and complexity in implementing more wholistic education plans.
Finally, a cornerstone of domestic infrastructure is healthcare. Healthcare is widely
considered to be one of the fundamental rights provided to all individuals without discrimination.
Thus, the organized provision of this human right by a government becomes instrumental in the
citizen’s perception of the government’s stability and domestic infrastructure. Since healthcare, a
human right, is often provided by the government, the provision or non-provision of it to citizens
may have a dramatic effect on the violence. In United Nations General Assembly Resolution
34/58 it stated “Peace and security, in their turn, are important for the preservations and
improvement of the health of all people, and the cooperation among nations on vital health issues
can contribute importantly to peace,” which underscores the necessity for healthcare to be
understood as not only necessary to healthy domestic infrastructure, but also the foundation of
durable peace (United Nations General Assembly, 34th sess.: 1979-1980, 1979). Sherin (2018)
points out the presence of a bilateral relationship between peace and healthcare is because they
both have a fundamental link to inalienable rights. While there is a clear gap in literature
regarding the ways in which healthcare is directly linked via data to more peaceful outcomes in
civil war, there is a clear theoretical link. Healthcare is linked to unalienable human rights, thus
when healthcare is denied so is a human right. This deprivation of a human right, over time, can
stir up grievances which lead to civil war. Such intersectionality between these two variables was
seen in the aforementioned UN Resolution 34/58 (United Nations General Assembly, 34th sess.:
1979-1980, 1979).
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Peace Durability
Peace durability is quintessentially measured as the length of time a country will be
engaged in peace after no longer being considered engaged in conflict. Therefore, the theoretical
understanding of peace durability is centered around how long that peace, or length of time a
country is no longer engaged in civil war, is able to last before a return to war ensues. Peace
durability can have many influencing factors ranging from negotiated settlement, third party
involvement, and cultural values. There are also studies that suggest that in repeating civil wars
when peace durability is not occurring, that the same factors that were present and incited
violence in the first civil war may make the second civil war begin (Walter, 2011). Some
research suggests that a well negotiated peace agreement is far superior to a military victory
because a military victory creates asymmetry in the government which leads to inevitable
downfall because of the lack of inclusiveness (Joshi, 2013; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Time and time
again, the negotiated settlement is found to be statically significant and essential to establishing
democracy which leads to durable peace (Joshi, 2013). While, at first, a negotiated peace
settlement may seem like an obvious answer because a military victory is not capable of
surmounting the limitations to peace as efficiently as peace agreement, there is a concern with
this theory. This assumes that all impediments to peace are known when negotiating a peaceful
settlement. Certainly, this is not true. While some impediments to peace, such as sectarian
violence for example, may be able to be accounted for in customized negotiations, there can still
be unforeseen actions like civil unrest that occur. Like Abu-Nimer & Nasser attempting to
implement conflict management in schools in the Middle East, they had a difficult time creating
a specialized and appropriate plan for each school because they had to accounted for such
decentralized school systems (2017). To practically institute durable peace, assuming all issues
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cannot be adequately accounted for due too human error, there must be other realistic, yet
sustainable ways to form durable peace.
As mentioned in the discussion of domestic infrastructure, negotiated settlements are
much more likely to lead to democracy and then foster durable peace (Joshi, 2013). This is
important to take into consideration because the coalition size is certainly important in
determining who will win, but the peace durability is founded on the idea of equity and political
inclusiveness when making decisions (Reynal-Querol, 2002). This is supported by research that
suggests that conflicts are most likely to recur when combatants on either side are not able to
decisively defeat the other, nor able to implement mutually acceptable agreements (Walter,
2011). An alternative explanation for the success of negotiated settlements includes that
negotiations are necessary so that the individuals affected by civil war or with preexisting
grievances can voice what they need. Thus, the presence of a negotiated settlement may in some
cases be the presence of individuals grievances being heard and resolved.
Law is also seen as playing a large role in peace durability. Walter (2011) suggests that
governments which are constrained by a constitution and follow the rule of law are less likely to
be reengaged in violence of any type. Additionally, measures that limit the government’s power
to rule outside of the law and take up unilateral power are perceived as attractive by the
negotiating power and therefore leads to an increased chance of peace negotiation. This offers
combatants as alternative way out of war. This type of research suggests that there may be a
necessary shift toward political, rather than military or economic intervention into civil war
which has been the status quo until now.
The shift toward political intervention into civil war rather than economic and militarybased intervention is important in creating sustainable and durable peace. The overall aim by of
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peace building, as stated by Reychler (2002) in the Peace and Conflict Studies Journal, “…to
create a win-win situation or a mutually benefiting sense of interdependence between all the
parties involved and to embed the peace building into institutions that reinforce and sustain the
process.” This approach is necessary to ensure that the peace being established is neither by force
or from threat of an overpowering coalition.
Rationale
Previous civil war literature suggests that violent outbreaks or civil war recurrences can
be motivated by desire for more, as in the greed model, or because of unmet needs, as in the
grievance model (DeRouen, Jr. & DeRouen, 2014). Since civil war can be spurred by unmet
needs of the population, such as in the case of the grievance model, I predict that durability of
peace increases when needs are met (DeRouen, Jr. & DeRouen, 2014). These needs are met
through the provision of domestic infrastructure, as opposed to augmented military investment or
presence. When there is violence spurred by grievance, renewing the military will temporarily
subdue the violence logistically, but it cannot resolve the issues in the long run. Thus, violence
will be more likely to reoccur. However, to understand why there is not the provision of
domestic infrastructure after civil war, one must critically evaluate the strategic leadership
behind the decision to invest in military, domestic infrastructure, or both.
Looking at the ways in which strategic leadership affects the investment of military and
domestic infrastructure reveals why there has been a constant skewedness toward military
investment. An analysis of the leaders’ mindset post-civil war affects the strategic decisionmaking process and will provide the primary motives of logical strategic decision making and
how these decision affect citizens. The following section further explains the intersectionality
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between a leader’s choice to invest in military or domestic infrastructure and the resulting peace
durability.
From the strategic standpoint, when a country exits civil-war, it is not illogical for the
leader of that country to invest monetarily in increasing security forces around the state since the
leverage of this human capital and security technology may mitigate violent outbreak in the
short-term (Herman, 2015).Yet, this increase in security reduces the structural capacity for
violence without addressing the underlying grievances to improve social conditions. The
reasoning behind the incapacity of security to address grievances is attributed to the greed v.
grievance model as discussed in the literature review. The primary understanding of the greed
model of civil war is thought to be rooted in the desire of one side to initiate a civil war because
of the desire and predicted ability to gain more than they currently have. Although one may be
inclined to think that such violence spurred by the greed model would result in peace time
incapable of being augmented by domestic infrastructure investment -this is not true. Even in the
case of the greed model, there will still be a population effected by the actions of the opposing
side. Once again, these actions will result in the presence of grievances that need to be addressed
by the controlling government. The grievances of the citizens are surrounded by their basic needs
not being met by the government. Therefore, when there is larger investment in the domestic
infrastructure and the needs of the population or the effected part of it are being met, then the
violence will be less likely to reoccur. Durable peace becomes more likely in these situations
where there is a higher investment in domestic infrastructure than military.
With this rational, one might consider the literature discussed above that explains that
negotiated settlements are less likely to reenter violence as a further confirmation of this rational.
The literature reveals that settlements in which both sides are able to voice their needs are the
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ones that result in more durable peace (Joshi, 2013). This pattern of peace durability evolution
may be explained by the notion that negotiated settlements result in a situation in which both
parties have agreed, to some extent, what the process of durable peace with materialize as in their
lives as well as to uphold peace if agreed-upon settlement is satisfied by the government. In a
negotiated settlement, there is a clear expectation of what will occur and what measures will be
taken to appease or recover both parties. Then, as both parties have negotiated what how their
needs should be met, the result is a lower likelihood of recurrent civil war.
The reason that this strategy is not used by many nations is because fortifying domestic
infrastructure amidst dwindling violence is not an obvious solution from the strategic leadership
stand point. As a post-civil war leader, there may seem to be natural incentive by augmenting
physical threat with physical security resources because there is an observed absence of conflict,
but this action is not resolution of violence. Based upon the argument that civil war (spurred by
greed and grievance) have perpetuated or renewed grievances that are only partially tamed by the
provision of domestic infrastructure, then investment in domestic infrastructure by the
controlling government in equal or advanced amounts as compared to investment in military
should result in more durable peace. Since negotiated settlements may serve as evidence in
support of this hypothesis, then it is not illogical to predict that government investment in nontraditional security factors, at the right ratio in proportion to GDP and traditional security
investment will result in a decreased recurrence of violent outbreak. The rationale concludes, that
since civil war sparked by grievance, and even greed-related factors, results in a citizenry that is
fight for increased provision of domestic infrastructure related goods, although physical security
measures seem to be the logical solution because it temporarily mitigates violence; it is not a
permeant solution. Rather, not addressing the grievances of the citizenry will result in a
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reengagement of civil war and lack of peace durability because the physical security only
temporarily addresses the outcome of the civil war, not the root cause. So, when a leader invests
more heavily in domestic infrastructure post-civil war, there will be a greater likelihood of peace
durability because the root causes of the civil war are being address and the resolution of
violence and increased peace durability will therefore follow.
Quantitative Investigation: The Roles of Military and Domestic Infrastructure in
Peace Durability since 1945
The quantitative analysis of the roles of military and domestic infrastructure reviews the
possibility that investment in domestic infrastructure, opposed to sole or primary investment in
military security, post-civil war will increase the likelihood of peace durability as discussed in
the rationale. The use of data enables a high-level and far-reaching analysis of the proposed
theory. By evaluating globally each case of post-civil war peace that also had complete data
regarding specific domestic infrastructure-related and military-related variables (detailed below)
this allows for a general conclusion about the impact of domestic infrastructure in facilitating
peace durability.
Existing Quantitative Evidence
There is substantial previous research and ground work about civil war and the influence
of different variables. Specifically, variables such as GDP-per capita and the polity score, or how
a government is ranked numerically on a scale ranging from completely democratic to
completely autocratic, have been widely studied. There are two main conclusions about the
relation of these two variables to the likelihood of civil-war that should be also be considered in
the evaluation. Understanding the known outcomes of specific variables and how they play a part
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in civil war will illuminate possible patterns in the application of other variables, such as those
related to military and domestic infrastructure.
The relation between the regime type of a nation measured through the polity score has
been established by many scholars suggesting that regimes that are either pure democracy or
pure autocracy are those least susceptible to civil war (DeNardo, 2014; Muller & Weede, 1990;
Fein, 1995; Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997; Regan & Henderson, 2002; Abouharb & Cingranelli,
2007; Vreeland, 2008). The basis for many of these arguments is stemmed from some of the
earliest work about regime type and civil war which discussed structural opportunities for dissent
groups to take advantage of. Multiple investigations found that regimes that were neither
democratic and collaborative nor democratic without opportunity for action were most
susceptible to civil war. Those regimes that tend towards the middle of scale and are part
democratic and part dictatorship are commonly referred to as anocratic. In the past two decades
studies by Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon & Latin (2003) have been published that confirm the
above argument which is now commonly referred to as the “anocracy hypothesis.” Thus, the
expectation is to see that the polity score is a significant variable in determining the likelihood of
post-civil war peace in the quantitative investigation of global civil wars as outlined below.
Another variable that expected to be significant in determining the likelihood of civil war
is GDP per capita. GDP per capita, along with other variables such as infant mortality, are
variables that capture economic well-being. Many studies have shown that the lower the
economic well-being of a nation the higher the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon & Laitin,
2003; Sambanis, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). If economic well-being is significant in
the onset of civil war, then one may predict that it will also be a factor of high consideration
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when predicting the likelihood that there will be a civil war onset again, after peace. This reveals
that lower the GDP per capita is, the less likely peace durability should be.
Methodology
To understand how increased or balanced investment in domestic infrastructure in
relation to investment in military impacts durability of peace, I will create a model that tests the
influence of the independent variables (amount of investment in domestic infrastructure or
military) on the dependent variable (re-engaged in civil war or not). The logistical regression
model will test the influence of several domestic infrastructure factors (healthcare, education,
and social welfare) and their influence on peace durability post-civil war. This replicates the
well-known model completed by Walter (2002). The base model includes variables measuring
time since the end of the last civil war, polity, and polity durability. This model includes controls
for time standard to the literature and controls for the underlying baseline hazard rate. This
model will measure the following hypothesis:
H: As public infrastructure support (IV) increases in relation to investment in military
post-civil war, the length of peace time (DV) will increase.
The unit of analysis for this model is a year that a country is not engaged in civil war post
a civil war episode throughout 1945-2015. An observation enters that data when the civil
violence ends and stays until violence reemerges. This yielded 30,254 episodes and excludes
countries in constant civil conflict because this model is measuring the effect of durability of
peace and a state in constant war has not yet experienced an episode of peace. A country must
first be engaged in civil war because the research is measuring how a government’s choices
affects the durability of peace. The only way for peace to break down again, is if there has
already been a civil violence episode.
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variable will be measured through UCDP/PRIO Uppsala Database (Peace
Research Institute Oslo, 2019). This data base codes a violent outbreak as 25 or more deaths
which is a threshold high enough to account for violent outbreaks without ignoring outbreaks to
the extent that it becomes rare. This is coded as a binary variable whether or not the country is
engaged in civil war. In the database used for this research, a country enters the database when it
is in peace time and drops out of the population when it encounters violence again. This data in
this model measures peace durability post-civil war.
Independent Variables
The independent variables will be measured through the government’s distribution of
money or ratio of government investment into the said variable out of annual spending budget. A
primary reason for this type of measurement is because money is zero sum. Money invested in
the military is money not invested in the school systems for example. Thus, looking at a
country’s investment will measure the government’s choices. Additionally, using the investment
as a ratio can help offset apparent differences between countries’ investments in civil war. Using
investment as a ratio also complements the notion that investment is zero sum.
GDP per capita will be assessed in US dollars. GDP per capita can help to assess the level
of development of a country while the ratio allows an equal analysis of the amount of investment
from country to country. This information comes from the World Bank (2018). Many of the
countries that are engaged in civil war repeatedly tend to be countries that are not well tracked.
The final number able to be assessed with accurate information ranges from 791-1,860
observations dependent on the information being analyzed. This variable is included as a control.
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The timesince variable which codes for years in peace since the last civil war episode.
This counts upwards numerically and will reset if the state exits the database because a
breakdown of peace occurred Thus, the expectation is that the higher the increase in time since
civil war, the less likely the country is likely to be re-engaged in civil war. Following the
controls for time, the next variable measured is the polity. The polity scores are recorded in the
regression base model. Polity is analyzed on a scale of -10 to 10, autocracy to consolidated
democracy, respectively. Polity captures global trends of governance at a high level by
measuring the authority within a state. The polity score captures the regime authority and this
measure of -10 to 10 is reported by the Polity IV Project (Systematic Peace, 2016). It is predicted
that anocracy (close to zero on the polity scale) is closely related with the onset of political
instability.
Education investment will look at the amount of money that is invested in primary and
tertiary education after or between civil violence. This, too, will be a percentage of GDP. There
are certainly many ways and sub-areas of education to concentrate in such a primary, secondary,
tertiary education, or even designated scholarship money. However, for this research a high-level
analysis will suffice. It will show the amount of money that is being given to help promote
education which captures how the government’ choices regarding money allocation affect the
peace durability. This data will be extracted from the World Bank database (2018). This variable
is selected to measure domestic infrastructure since education is a variable that is represented
yearly in state’s budget. Accordingly, it is simple to see how the budget is adjusted and track the
changes as the historical events occur.
Health investment is also measured as a portion of GDP. Like the previous two variables,
using money as the measurement will analyze the government’s choice to invest in public health.
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This information is taken from the World Bank website as well (2018). Health investment is the
other variable that is selected to measure domestic infrastructure alongside education. Like
health investment, it is clear to track the fluctuation in health investment and cross reference it
with specific historical events. The result is that it clear to see the ways the health investment
impacts the citizens and the stability of a country. Unlike many of the alternative variables
related to domestic infrastructure which were mentioned in the literature review, health and
education are observable by the amount of money a government chooses to invest. This is
essential to making an educated conclusion about the data and the impact of the domestic
infrastructure on post-civil war durability.
Military will be measured by the amount of government spending invested in military
between civil wars. These numbers will come the World Bank (2018). Like education and health,
it is measured as the percentage of GDP that is invested in order to capture how investment
choices affect the government. Regarding interaction with the dependent variable, the likelihood
that a state will re-engage in civil war, it is predicted that high levels of investment in military
will result in a positive correlation to a re-engagement in civil war. This would mean that
investment in military is correlated with less durable peace.
Discussion & Results
After running the logistical regressions, the results suggest that countries which invested
more greatly in health and education as percentages of GDP in periods of post-civil war peace
were more likely to not see a breakdown of peace. Likewise, countries that invested more
heavily in military expenditures as a portion of their GDP in post-civil war peacetime were more
likely to see a breakdown of peace. The results are displayed in the table below.
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Timesince

Table 1: Health, Education and Military Investment
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
-.099
-.188
-.172
(.047)**
(.064)*
(.33)

Model 4
-.118
(.229)

Polity

-.016
(.312)

-.000
(.08)*

-.000
(.065)*

-.005
(.042)**

Real GDP per capita

-.000
(.005)***

-.000
(.000)***

-.000
(.075)*

-.000
(.229)

Health/GDP

---

-.280
(.049)**

Education/GDP

---

---

Military/GDP

---

---

---

.073
(.007)**

N

2368

791

993

1860

χ2
Significance:

22.051

16.74
***=0.01

27.79

*=0.1

.0093
**=0.05

---

-.201
(.072)*

---

---

In the table above, one can observe the model’s negative relationship between all
healthcare investment, education investment, country development and reengagement in civil
war. This means that investment in healthcare and education improve peace durability of a
nation. Likewise, there is positive relationship between military investment as a percentage of
GDP and likelihood that a state will be reengaged in civil war. The results of analysis suggest
that military investment is correlated with a lack of durable peace. The logistical regression
model supports the hypothesis.
The logistical regression models are run as independent models, not in one model with all
variables included because that would limit the amount of observations too severely to observe
meaningful correlations. However, when looking at Models 2 through 4 (Model 1 serves as the
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base model), one can see the military investment has the greatest significance of the models (as
noted by the symbol: *) which is found in Model 4. This can be for several reasons including the
fact that military expenditures are often reported by states and the data is easily collected. There
is also a large amount of observations for this model that help support the correlation between
military investment and a lack of peace durability.
Model 2 and 3 analyze the correlation between healthcare investment and peace
durability and education investment and peace durability, respectively. While Model 2 has a
higher significance level, this could be because when individuals are receiving the immediate
medical care that they need, this helps them to understand the government as power that can
govern and help its citizens. Previous studies show that even a 1% decrease in healthcare
investment significantly increases the mortality across all metrics from infants to adults during
peace time alone (Budhdeo, Watkins, Atun, Williams, Zeltner, & Maruthappu, 2015). Likewise,
education has a lower significance however this does not necessarily mean that it less influential.
Since education can have different value in different countries and the school systems are
orchestrated differently, then monetary investment may have different results. Nonetheless,
education is still seen to be correlated with peace durability as compared to military.
In synthesis, the table above displays shows that an increased investment in military in
post-civil war nations results in an increased likelihood of re-engaged civil war and therefore
reduced durability of peace. This is displayed through Model 4. The previous two models,
Models 2 and 3, show how increased investment in variables such as healthcare and education
result in a decreased likelihood of civil war re-engagement and therefore increased post-civil war
peace durability.
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Qualitative Analysis: The Role of Military and Domestic Infrastructure in Peace Durability
in Iraq
The study of Iraq and its continued engagement in civil conflict underscores the necessity
of peace durability research from both the quantitative and qualitative perspective. While the
above quantitative analysis illuminates larger patterns and support for the hypothesis, the
qualitative investigation is able to provide explanations and instances of how data points present
themselves in real life. This type of analysis captures the story and narrative of civil war and
those affected by it so that those narratives can be used to develop a more robust depiction of
such interstate conflict. This, in turn, may be used to help the policy and legislation which
dictates the dominate standard of recovery from civil war. In the case of Iraq, which is the
country of focus for this qualitative analysis, it is notable that government underwent a unique
set of circumstances and was subjected to a wide range of intense foreign influences that
contributed to their initial instability. Beginning in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq under
President George W. Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attack. However, it was not Bush’s decision
alone. There was strong bipartisanship in congress, media and public approval for America’s
entrance into Iraq (Hanson, 2013). After the U.S. entered, the heightened militaristic pressure
effected a consolidation of terroristic forces, Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), ruled by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, and Osama bin Laden’s already-established group, al-Qaeda. Together
they formed Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This union is speculated to have occurred because
when the United States entered Iraq, it dismantled the Iraqi government. This was done
through a process known as de-Ba’athification which formed a power vacuum and gave
incentive for these groups to have a larger impact on the state. AQI was a Sunni militant
group that was strongly opposed to the Shi’ite government which was being established
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through American involvement. Weinberg (2014) argues that without the presence of U.S.
these groups would not have had the ability to grow nor the strong motivations to act as
violently in the short-term or long-term. The following section of this thesis begins with an
overview of the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq and the selection specific
events which will be under analysis. Next, there will be a history of the Iraq War and the
accompanying religious grievances as it relates to the rise of ISIL as well. This is followed
by an analysis of peacetime investments, the subsequent rise of ISIL, reemergence of
religious grievances again and current peacetime investments. The analysis illuminates how
decisions regarding investment directly affect the health of the nation and opportunities for
peace durability.
Iraq has a long history of several different religions co-existing in the same location (see
Figure 1, below). Currently, the population religious division of Iraq as reflected in the CIA
World Fact Book is approximately 64-69% -Shia Muslim, Sunni- 29%-34% and approximately
1%-4% of “other religions” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). These other religions include
minorities such as Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Jewish and Yazidi. The major divide between
the Sunnis and Shias in also reflected geographically in the below map (Holden, 2015). When
discussing the sectarian differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims, it is important to note that
this is the longest-standing divide in Islam’s history. This division can be traced back to days of
Prophet Muhammad; more specifically his death in 632 C.E. Since the death of Prophet
Muhammad, there has divide amongst Muslims regarding who should have been the rightful
successor to the Prophet. This religious divide has, overtime, caused up risings in violence across
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Iraq as different

FIGURE 1

political leaders
whom identified
with a specific
religious sect
would quietly
oppress the other
sects with which
he did not identify.
Reflecting on the
rule of Saddam
Hussein, a Sunni
leader in a Shi’itemajority country, he would use his authoritarian power to oppress the Shi’ites. Under the rules of
Saddam, Shi’ites were often treated as second-class citizens and were denied access to political
power. Many of the grievances felt by Shi’ites and Sunnis will reemerge with the presence of
ISIL.
2003-2011: The Iraq War
Shifting focus to the U.S involvement in Iraq, one of the first events that occurred with
the onset of Western involvement in Iraq was the process of de-Ba’athification. This was led by
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was a transnational government of Iraq
established by the United States. Paul Bremer, leader of the CPA became the formal leader of
Iraq for the first 14 months of U.S. occupation (Dept. of Army Announcement, 2016). Under his
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leadership, Iraq’s government was destabilized. The lack of government would dismantle the
rule of harsh leader. However, the elimination of a harsh leader would also eliminate the Iraqi
history during and sense of society that accompanied this harsh rule. Accordingly, during
Hussein’s role as leader of Iraq, pledging allegiance to the Ba’ath party was an unspoken, but
present pre-requisite to acquiring jobs with livable wages and access to political and civic life.
De-Ba’athification dismissed all individuals belonging to the Ba’ath party from their jobs. The
intent of this process was to rid Iraq of the Ba’ath party’s influence because the Ba’ath party was
seen as extension of Saddam Hussein’s unethical and undemocratic rule. From inside of Iraq the
effects of de-Ba’athification were much more intense than its possibly innocent intentions. It
resulted in an unsurmountable and growing number of unemployed individuals and frustrations
with both the Iraqi and American government (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Sissons & Al-Saiedi
(2013) detail in their report that according to the International Center for Transnational Justice
between 2003 and 2006, the CPA dismissed thousands of individuals in the education,
healthcare, and other technical and cultural services industries because of their affiliations with
the Ba’ath party. Specifically, Iraq’s Ministry of Education was most severely affected because
the Ba’ath party distributed its propaganda via classroom education much like any other
government. In the eyes of the CPA, this was immediate grounds for elimination and rebuilding
of the network of educational institutions as a while. The results of de-Ba’athification in the
Ministry of Education were approximately 17,000 dismissals by January 2005 without due
process (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Not only was unemployment frustrating to the citizens, but
from the governmental perspective, there was now a complete lack of infrastructure as there
were no individuals to operate the various institutions such as education and healthcare.
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In many ways, it could be seen that the process of de-Ba’athification was felt more
severely by Sunni Muslims. As part of Saddam’s leadership, being part of the Ba’ath party also
meant that you identified as Sunni. The result is that a disproportionate number of Sunnis in
comparison to Shi’ites were the ones who were released of jobs and livelihood. Iraq, as an entire
state, felt the effects of these crass actions, however it was Sunni Muslims who incurred the
largest gross reduction of power. Now, the minority who had held the majority power were
powerless, and the majority who had felt powerless were on an even playing field. This caused
grievances to emerge for Sunni and Shi’ites alike. However, the lack of presence of the Sunni
controlled government allowed for the structural opportunity for the entrenched grievances of the
Shi’ites to rise again. As referenced in the literature review, these grievances can attribute to the
rise of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).
Due to the widespread nature of the Ba’ath party and the subsequent vetting, there was a
complete downfall of the state (Dozier, 2016). The vetting process which removed all members
of the Ba’ath party from their job or position was enacted without the proper civil support in
place leaving the Iraqis people feeling angered and frustrated. A report published in Al-Jazeera
in 2008 shows the true severity of the de-Ba’athification law and lingering frustrations and
effects it had on its citizens. It not only cites various local articles discussing their frustrations,
but it forwardly addresses the obvious criticisms this process received in Iraq such as:
[…the CPA, de-Ba’athification law, and the constitution are] under accusations of abuse
of this law "for the favor of the Shia parties" and it came as a result of the nature the
"Iranian-American Relations" which were "highly coordinated" in that period.]
( [ الجزيرةAl-Jazeera], 2008).
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This excerpt shows that way that the forced dismissals undermined Iraq’s government for a
protracted period and lead to a sense of grievance among all those effected while also having a
strong effect on the religious power struggles within Iraq (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Yet, after
Saddam Hussein’s downfall, much of Iraq indiscriminately went without basic services such as
water and electricity (Dozier, 2016). This was followed by a militaristic impact as the Iraqi
military and security forces were disbanded. The second element of the CPA-instituted deBa’athification law was enacted immediately after and included the appointment and hiring of
385,000 armed forces, 285,000 of the Interior Ministry (police), and 50,000 in the presidential
security unites (Pfiffner, 2010).
A proper account of America’s involvement in Iraq could not be genuinely complete
without addressing the heinous instances and impact of torture such as those at Abu Ghraib
Prison. The actions that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison were instances of torture caused by a
slew of psychological effects relating to obedience and group think. The situation resulted in
human right violations against prisoners of the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq by the U.S. Army and
Central Intelligence Agency. The atrocities included physical abuse, sexual abuse, rape, sodomy,
torture and murder. These violations became widespread public news and further deteriorated the
relationship between Iraq and American involvement and bolstered the desire for American
troops to leave (Sullivan, 2008). These events are essential to mention because they contribute to
the grievances felt by the Iraqi individuals while heightening the need for not only an Iraqi
military, but also an Iraqi government prepared to protect its people. Despite America’s attempt
to squash terrorism and the authoritarian rule of Hussein, VNSAs continued to rise to power
quietly. Although U.S. troops were able to temporarily disband JTJ through the death of their
leader al-Zarqawi in 2006 (COD: U.S. airstrike), the successors rebranded and continued to
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change its title to various temporary names. Years later, the world would come to know this
group as the IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.
Overall, from inside Iraq, the entirety of the Iraq War painted a picture of skepticism,
bloodshed, and inadequacy regarding U.S. capabilities to establish a peaceful, democratic society
abroad. But, from the American perspective at this time, the primary goals of the 2003
invasion, the defeat al-Qaeda and replacement of Saddam Hussein’s corruption with
democracy, had been accomplished. The de-Ba’athification process was working insofar that the
Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein was entirely eradicated. The domestic infrastructure in this
case was simply collateral damage.
After a troop surge and a climbing death toll of 4,000 American soldiers, the American
public disapproval hit an all-time low (Cable News Network, 2018). President Barak Obama was
forced to begin withdrawing troops in 2009. The invasion of Iraq incurred unforeseen costs and
losses of American troops (IRIN, 2012). The initial 70% of the public that supported U.S.
involvement now yearned for withdrawal (Hanson, 2013). The new Iraqi leadership would soon
be able to make independent investment decisions to rebuild the domestic infrastructure and
repair the grievances felt by both the Sunni and the Shi’ite groups. Yet, the original interim
government lead by Paul Bremer was no longer in power and there is a new Shi’ite President of
Iraq as of 2006, Jalal Talabani. This provides opportunity for a new era of strategic decision
making not influenced by reactionary investment in domestic infrastructure.
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Peacetime investment following the Iraq War is a representation of the primary concerns
of the governing body following the war. The investment choices of the government signaling
what the
FIGURE 2
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bodies perceived understanding of the people’s needs (Kregel, 1994). In Figure 2 above, within
the dashed box which indicates the period of peacetime, there is a clear increase in military
investment and no other intense investments in education and military. This figure represents
Iraq’s investment in healthcare and military investment at high level to provide the opportunity
to see how it correlates with different period of civil peace or conflict. In Figure 2 (and later
Figure 3), education expenditure is not accounted for due to a quota which keeps the percentage
of investment equal across the time period evaluated (Index Mundi, 2015). From the data
available, certainly, one perspective suggests that a leader may be inclined to think that military
investment during peacetime is a way to ensure that there will not be violent outbreak again,

41

however this thesis’s rational explains an alternative perspective (Herman, 2015). When a
country invests heavily in militaristic forces during peacetime, this increases the possibility of
destabilization in the country because the militaristic forces are not able to address the grievances
which caused the civil war initially. Thus, there is an expectation that those grievances will arise
once more and cause the country to re-engage in civil war. In this instance, the Iraq War is
followed by the rise of ISIL.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): 2014-Present
Looking specifically at the events that happened in Iraq during the early 2000’s, such as
the rise of different VNSAs, there are several instances of large changes in budgetary investment.
These differences in investment, although sometimes disguised, had unique effects on the
country. The ebbs and flows in investment at crucial times during Iraq’s attempt to stabilize
contributed to Iraq’s lack of peace durability time and time again. Considering the above
peacetime investments by the new Shi’ite Iraqi president, it is not shocking that there was the
rise of ISIL, a Sunni militant and extremist group, with such strong grievances. In many ways,
Sunnis across Iraq felt a lack of power as de-Ba’athification was recently instituted and there was
the appointed leadership of new Shi’ite leader where Sunnis had held all the power before
(Global Policy Forum, 2019). Thus, the pouring in of military investment in peacetime when the
lack of domestic infrastructure in Iraq (from de-Ba’athification) demanded the provision of
social services such as healthcare through domestic infrastructure investment resulted in rise of
grievances which may inspire civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The following paragraphs
investigate this further.
Tracking the military investment and health investment in the peacetime years of 2011
and 2012, there a general is a drop in both. When pairing this with knowledge about the ways
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that increased domestic infrastructure will help to repair the grievances by meeting the necessary
basic needs of individuals, perhaps there was not enough investment by the leadership. The small
percentages invested during peacetime were not great enough to begin repairing the domestic
infrastructure which was barely existing after de-Ba’athification and eight years of war.
Additionally, the aforementioned Al-Qaeda leader was captured and the individual that lead
Islamic State of Iraq (which would later become ISIL), Abu Ayyub al-Masri, died in a U.S.Iraqi operation and the organization was transitioning to Abu Bakr al -Baghdadi as the
leader. ISIL remained relatively undetectable until it gained traction during the Syrian
war in 2013, although their grievances and Sunni-focused goals long preceded the
foundation group. Immediately prior to ISIL rising as a prominent VNSA, the graph
above reveals the spike in military expenditures while education and healthcare see a less
dramatic involvement. While the government was not able provide the necessary social
services due to the investment in military, this provided ISIL the opportunity to recruit.
ISIL was able to provide social services not provided by the government, like many
VNSAs do, and grow in strength and numbers (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Since there is such
a strong increase in military investment which is met in significantly less proportions to
investment in domestic infrastructure, the hypothesis may predict less durability of peace
especially with the presence of ISIL. As the rational section mentioned, the lack of
investment in domestic infrastructure does not help to reaffirm the confidence of the
individuals in a war-torn state of the capabilities of their government if individuals are
continuing to need to live without a sufficient education or healthcare system (Budhdeo
et al., 2015).
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Understanding how the Iraqi War impacts ISIL’s reign can be increasingly complicated.
Although this time period is within the boundaries of the Iraq War, many of the events
contributed significantly to the development of ISIL and the ways that the peacetime monetary
investments were not able to satisfy the grievances of the different sects. With Iraq’s city center
in shambles as the de-Ba’athification process wreaked havoc on social instructions and domestic
infrastructure, American forces were hunting down Osama bin Laden and using force to do so. In
2006, despite the drop in military investment, as seen in the above graph, according to many
news sources, there was a strong wave of sectarian violence that took the lives of nearly 1000
individuals. Waves of sectarian violence that continue to surface throughout the war provide the
grounds that the violence in Iraq was still being influenced by sectarian disputes.
Perhaps the most well-known accomplishments that occurred during the Iraq War is in
2011 when United States Navy SEALs, SEAL Team Six’s executed Osama bin Laden. Bin
Laden was the founder and first leader of the Islamist extremist group, al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was
the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and an impetus for entry into Iraq.
The war that was dubbed “the War on Terror” had seemingly accomplished its goal. So why then
did Iraq struggle with forming a cohesive government after 2011, the end of the Iraq War? A
look into the rise of sectarian grievances and power vacuums during peacetime offers a valuable
explanation.
The impact of the capture of Osama bin Laden should also be considered in critical light.
While the overall political security may be augmented, the immediate affects for everyday
citizen may be less positive. Like many religious and secular organizations, what al-Qaeda (and
ISIL) can offer is physical safety and public services for themselves and their families in a time
when the government cannot. In some cases, they also offer personal recognition, leadership
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roles and monetary stability. This directly mirrors basic psychological needs of humans that, in
the presence of an unstable government, are not being met. Additionally, since most terrorist
organizations and members of the organizations believe they are not causing terror but are rather
carrying out acts of loyalty to god or political justice, they become a shelter for these individuals
surrounded by war and violence (European Institute of Peace, 2018). The period immediately
following the dismantling of al-Qaeda was seen as a huge success for the United States and the
many American citizens interpreted it as the beginning of the end. In reality, what was the
beginning of the end for many Americans was the beginning of another beginning for Iraqis.
The process of de-Ba’athification had dismantled one government and forced a new one to begin
with not prior infrastructure. This was dangerous because the government was not equipped and
unable to provide Iraqi citizens with domestic infrastructure to feel secure and equal in their own
state, therefore allowing another power vacuum to potentially rise again. This is evidenced by the
continuous attacks on minority groups that began during peacetime (IRIN, 2011). These
grievances against minority and majority continues to develop across Iraq. On in particular group
that carried out attacks and came to power is known as ISIL.
ISIL rises to power in 2013-2014. During this time, acts of terrorism are increasing
throughout Iraq. They occupy largely the north of Iraq and Kurdistan where they carry out
merciless acts of genocide again Shi’ite Muslims and Yazidis, a minority religious group located
primarily in the north of Iraq and Kurdistan. The military investment continues to rise, reaching
5.3% in 2015 and the healthcare investment climbs to 3.3% in 2015 (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2017) (World Bank, 2018). These numbers are radically different from
years prior where health and military investment moved in equal parts. The explanation for this
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shift in focus is most likely explained by the new Sunni president, Fuad Masum, who took office
in 2014 (Timelines of History, 2018).
2016-2018 brought about difficult times in Iraq. This could be explained through the shift
in focus of priorities away from domestic infrastructure, to even more intensely on military force
as indicated in the figure to the below. Education is not included as a measurement of domestic
infrastructure due
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forward is spotty at best due to the rise of ISIL and data from these years still being currently
reported and backfilled. However, there is a continued increase in military investment, as
compared to historic averages. While ISIL forces have retreated, they are most prominent in the
northern Iraq, Kurdistan, and northern Syria according to a New York Times article and actively
recruiting by offering individuals social services that the government is not providing such as
healthcare and education (Callimachi, 2018). The article affirms the assertion that ISIL is less
powerful in 2016 than it was in 2014-2015. However, relying on the rational and theory
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discussed in thesis, there is reason to believe that less ISIL forces will not necessarily correlate to
increased peace durability. Rather, the peace durability will be dependent upon the governments
investment strategies which address both the grievances of the nation and the necessity for a
security apparatus in tandem. The decision to invest, where to invest, and how much will
determine the success of the peace for years to come.
Discussion
Iraq’s experience with civil war is unique, but it is important to understand that each
country will present investment in military and domestic infrastructure in varying ways. In the
specific case above, the military investment as a part of GDP had to be weighed with the
presence of American forces. Considering the amount of investment that was given by the Iraqi
government in combination with the military force provided by the American government, the
military presence and influence was in fact much more intense than any numeric value could
have revealed. Yet, the investment in domestic infrastructure regarding education was
immeasurable since it had been at a fixed rate for many years. Still, the insight from the data
available in the logit models can give new perspectives to the war and how these two variables
interact.
For Iraq, although the military expenditure percentages had to be taken in account with
the presence of foreign military aid and the education variable was fixed, there are still
meaningful insights knowing the correlation between peace durability is highly correlated with
an increase in domestic infrastructure. Other countries may present their investment in military
or domestic infrastructure in more traditional ways and the data may be more complete, however
it is important to work with data that is less than ideal since real-world application of this thesis
involves understanding partial data in complex circumstances. However, as mentioned in the
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results & discussion section, many times the information that is needed to conclusively draw an
empirical correlation is not available due to the condition of the country or the unwillingness of a
country to release data. Therefore, reflecting on the history of a country also allows one to fill in
the gaps that are not available numerically.
Another important aspect of integrating numerical values and correlations into
explanations is to understand the true representation of the data as well as capture elements, such
as the general morale of the individuals, which are sometimes undetectable when evaluating
solely statistical values. Additionally, pairing the historical reflection with the data illuminates
some of the surprising numbers that may be present and can help to understand nuances and
changes. For example, in Iraq there was an unexpected decrease in military and health
expenditures once bin Laden was captured (World Bank, 2018). Yet there was increase in both
types of expenditures occurred once the Iraq War ended and was in peacetime (World Bank,
2018). Understanding the recruitment tactics of ISIL as well as which grievances drive civil war
can aid in understanding how ISIL was able to provide resources which assisted ISIL’s rise and
temporary control of land (European Institute of Peace, 2018). Once data is paired with this
information, it becomes possible to speculate that during time of increased peace, a government
should be hesitant to discontinue providing domestic infrastructure support in any capacity
otherwise there is the potential for another group or side to step in and gain power especially in
areas where there are historical grievances. This is one possible explanation of the events in Iraq
during this time period.
Considering the overall trends in both Iraq and the fluctuating violent outbreaks, this
violence is due in part to re-emerging grievances. Reflecting on the literature review and
rationale, there is the notion that these grievances can be helped in part by augmenting the
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domestic infrastructure and ensuring that each party has the necessary basic care they need in
order to live life. This includes, but is not limited to, education, healthcare as well as
employment or means of coming together as a community.
Application: Iraq’s Policy Brief
The previous quantitative investigation and qualitative analysis illuminate the ways in
which domestic infrastructure supports peace durability as explained in the rationale. Once this
information is established, it is essential to understand the global implications of this knowledge
and how it can aid in peace building. The following policy brief will evaluate the ways that Iraq
can alter their strategic leadership decisions to create strong peace durability with less structural
opportunities for civil war reoccurrence. Beginning with the current situation and structural
opportunities for civil war, the discussion will then transition into the real constraints the nation
may face when instituting this strategic approach. Immediately following will be a discussion of
what types of policy may be implemented which is then concluded with an overview of global
implications of such a potential shift in policy.
Background & Status Quo
Many individuals within the United States shy away from considering the events of the Iraq
War a true civil conflict, although this term most accurately describes the situation. Beginning in
2003, when the Bush administration decided to enter Iraq with espoused intent of eliminating the
dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist party, the United States was entering a
country with a citizenry that possessed religious cleavages and long-standing grievances. The
violence that reemerged and the sectarian grievances felt were of those individuals who were
oppressed by others (Lipka, 2014). Thus, perhaps there is an imperative that the state of Iraq has
a stronger hand in repairing its social cleavages. Any increased military involvement, rather than
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power-sharing discussion from the United State or foreign states, continued to prolong, not
hasten, the end of the civil war (Fearon, 2007). While this was not publicized on American
media, that should not diminish the existence of such variables. Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath
party, both affiliated with Sunni Islam, continued the marginalization of the minority Shi’ite
Muslims in Iraq. While there was the presence of this civil grievance, the Bush administration
and many others supporting U.S. involvement preferred the term “sectarian violence” instead of
civil war. However, sectarian violence does not accurately account for all the events and
motivations of this armed conflict. The Iraq War was a civil conflict despite American
involvement not only because it meets the definition of 25 battle-related deaths within a country,
the same threshold which was used in the Quantitative Investigation, but because the violence
emerged amongst the country’s groups of citizens.
What is often dubbed, “The fight against ISIS” is, too, considered a civil conflict in the
context of this thesis. After the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011, there was a
rise in the strength of the extremist group. The extremist group took advantage of the structural
incapacity of the state to act as a government independently. This is a common occurrence that
when there is a lack of physical security that typically mitigate violence. The tension along the
Sunni-Shi’ite minority axis was then able to re-emerge causing a re-occurrence of a long string
of civil wars. The following portion of this policy brief will identify the underlying and
publicized grievances within Iraq as well as Western misconceptions about the wars. After a
discussion of US involvement from 2003 and 2017 in Iraq there will be a realistic overview of
the current state of Iraq, a potential policy recommendation to reduce the likelihood of another
civil conflict recurrence, and strategic decision-making process.
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The rule of Saddam Hussein, often perceived as a dictatorship, was one of the U.S.’s
espoused reasonings for entering into Iraq and dismantling the Ba’ath party. Additionally, the
rule of this Ba’ath party, as mentioned in the qualitative analysis, was detrimental to the
representation and political health of the state. In 2003, after the entrance of the United States
and the subsequent fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party, Iraq’s capital erupted into a
frenzy of looting and lawlessness. While the Iraq’s political future hung in the balance, reestablishing order would become the most arduous task of those controlling forces in the capital.
Due to the economy that was already in shambles due to Saddam Hussein’s rule, rebuilding and
re-institutionalizing Iraq became extremely difficult. Furthermore, the task of rebuilding Iraq was
assigned to individuals such as Paul Bremmer, who have now admitted their unpreparedness to
take on such a role (Martin, 2013).
During this disordered time following the fall of Hussein, many Shi’ite Muslims, a
minority in Iraq who were brutalized by the rule of the Sunni dictator, were finding a renewed
sense of freedom among the chaotic Iraqi state. The chaos and lack of leadership in Iraq was
evident as several different governments emerged including the Interim Iraqi government,
Transitional Iraqi government, and the appointed new, permanent Iraqi government. During the
appointments of these three distinct governments, there was a continuous investment into
military spending. However, the disordered nature of the state and the historical marginalization
of non-Shi’ite groups meant that there was extensive need for domestic infrastructure reform,
especially healthcare services (World Health Organization, 2019). Based upon expenditure data
in Figure 2 and Figure 3 as discussed in the qualitative section, these underlying grievances were
not being met. It is clearly shown how the monetary investment of these governments was
designated largely toward military investment. This decision was made most likely because
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strategic leadership post-civil war, as discussed in the rationale, is often inclined to favor military
investment since it will temporarily mitigate violence. However, when the U.S. withdrew troops
in 2011, a large source of the physical security which was suppressing the violence was removed
(Brunner, 2018). Thus, the combined lack of domestic infrastructure and quick removal of
military forces created structural opportunities for extremist groups to thrive. This eventually
leads into the rise and presence of ISIL in Iraq during 2014-2017 which had developed into the
conquest of major northern cities including Fallujah, Mosul and Tikrit. Throughout these times,
the Iraqi government was forced to make decisions regarding the investment of the GDP into
military or domestic-infrastructure related goods and services. As military investment increased
as did the again-suppressed Sunni-Shia tensions.
ISIL gained territory by taking advantage of the civil tensions that had re-emerged
because of the historical religious reinforcing cleavages. The results of this long-standing
division can be seen referenced in Figure 1. Accordingly, U.S. troops were sent back in to defeat
the extremist group that was a threat to the rest of humanity. However, on December 10, 2017,
the Iraqi Prime Minister was able to announce that ISIL had been defeated from Iraq. This
celebration marked the end of an extremist group’s presence the beginning of re-focusing on the
religious cleavage that had been masked by the media-encompassing VNSA’s occupying the
Iraqi region.
As Nadim Shehadi of Chatham House mentions that many Western countries may have
focused too largely on the influence of VNSAs such as ISIL and failed to recognize the intense
discontentment and marginalization of the Sunni constituency (Grillot & Davenport, 2017). It is
not a coincidence that the presence of underlying grievances caused the rise of civil war
especially without dictatorship Hussein. Referring to the anocracy hypothesis, as discussed in the
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beginning the of quantitative investigation, the removal of the dictatorship in the absence of
Hussein’s harsh leadership and an un-established democracy, there was an increased likelihood
of civil war. When referencing the Polity Score database, this change in democracy is clear as the
polity score -9 (signaling autocracy) before the entrance of the U.S. to a +3, (signaling
democracy) once the United States exited (Systematic Peace, 2018). Accordingly, there was a
power vacuum that occurred because of the civil unrest and the inability of the new and chaotic
government to satisfy the long-standing grievances of the not only the marginalized, but all those
who were victimized under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The power vacuum allowed for
non-state actors, such as ISIL, to gain traction since they can satisfy grievances the government
cannot. Remembering the proposed reasoning in the rationale that civil violence in spurred by
grievances, when the government is unable to provide these domestic goods and services because
of the nation’s choice to invest in military, like Iraq, then individuals may align their allegiances
with such violent non-state actors (European Institute of Peace, 2018).
Iraq’s current condition, from a domestic infrastructure and military standpoint, includes
a more intense investment in favor of military as displayed in Figure 1.2. Since the United States
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there has been a
consistent and incremental increase in military investment. This was due to wide-ranging factors
including the rise of several different VNSAs as well as extensive foreign involvement by the
American government. However, the continuous allocation of money in amounts far
outweighing those that support domestic infrastructure, although logical and warranted by the
Iraqi governments is what most likely what enabled a continuous break down of durable peace
although there were instances in which there was reduced violence. Accompanying the
increased investment in military was a lower amount of domestic infrastructure investment. This
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translates to less quality, and therefore, accessibility to both healthcare and education. For many
countries, especially a country like Iraq which once had a functioning and admirable healthcare
and education system, not having one can be devastating. The lack of healthcare can impact
people’s trust and confidence in the government as a capable governing institution (Shore, 2007).
In the realm of education, not having a system in place to educate children can affect the morale
of parents as well as the overall growth and development of Iraq’s future adults for the rest of
their lives. This means that the talent within Iraq and future of Iraq’s citizenry to be equipped
with conflict-resolution skills dramatically decreases. As Iraq’s government continues to restore
itself after the 2003 American invasion and de-Ba’athification, it becomes essential that the
government is able to act as a government by providing individuals with basic needs such as
healthcare and education. A restoration of the domestic infrastructure would be transformational
for the lives of the Iraqi citizens and the government. A restoration of domestic infrastructure
would allow the government to begin to smooth over long-term and entrenched sectarian
grievances held by the different sects of the Iraqi population.
Recommendation
After the consideration of Iraq’s past tension between the Sunni majority and Shi’ite
minority, the removal of physical security there is the increased opportunity for violence,
especially without a long-established, democratic government. Increasing support for domestic
infrastructure and decreasing the portion of money which is currently allocated to military
investments would have multiple benefits for Iraq as a whole. If the Iraq government is able to
invest in itself and make this decision without the assistance or consultation of a foreign country,
this could help to restore a sense of Iraqi nationalistic pride which was largely stripped away
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with de-Ba’athification. Additionally, Iraq’s investment would allow citizens to regain faith in
the government’s ability to operate and overcome power vacuums.
A restoration of Iraqi nationalistic pride would assist the government’s ability to function
and pass policy because of increasing support. This would not only help Iraq internally, but it
would allow the country to evolve away from being stereotyped as a war-torn country in need of
intervention from other countries. Therefore, the investment in domestic infrastructure does not
only assist the citizens, but it also helps the government itself evolve and overcome large barriers
as it moves away from its long-held stereotypes.
As Iraq continues to invest in domestic infrastructure, overtime, the consistent investment
should improve the quality of life of Iraqis throughout the country (Islam & Clarke, 2002).
Accordingly, there would be a renewed sense of faith in the government. This sense of reliability
will help the government further on the international stage as there is an accountability of Iraq to
its citizens and it is viewed as independent country. With the continued foreign involvement in
order to assist Iraq in being released form the grip of ISIL, the public perception has been shaped
around the knowledge that Iraq is a country requiring continued assistance in order to return to a
state of stability. Thus, maintain this stability, as done through a monetary renewal of domestic
infrastructure would establish this faith in the government in its ability to consider voices and
meet the needs of the citizens.
As referenced in the rationale and supported in the quantitative investigation, there is
undoubtedly a call to increase the amount of domestic infrastructure investment in the current
Iraqi government. The result of this increase is a predicted reduction of violence and better peace
durability. Considering the recent fall of ISIL and the continued withdrawal of troops, Iraq is
positioned to be at risk for a civil war reoccurrence once again (Marta, 2002). The withdrawal of
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physical security, in particular, escalates the opportunity for violence to break out again as
Sunni-Shia tensions rise again. Thus, as grievances are renewed, investing in education and
healthcare could help to alleviate these tensions as individuals feel as though their needs are
being met.
Education would be instrumental in the rebuilding process since previous literature
suggests that education can be a unique way to institute conflict-resolution practices (Abu Nimer
& Nasser, 2017). In the same way that specialized curricula were found to be helpful for students
and teachers in the past, this tactic could be used to bolster civil society in Iraq. This plan would
require not only intense investment monetarily, but also in time and human power to devise and
implement the plans. Furthermore, ensuring that there are physical structures for children to
attend school and receive this education should be a primary consideration, even preceding the
development of conflict-resolution action plans. Having a reliable education system is also a
long-term investment since the education system is a way to teach children, and tangentially
families, about political changes and active citizenship.
Considering the ways in which physical security suppresses small out breaks in the shortterm, but domestic infrastructure provides resolution of the root grievances in the long-term, it is
important to strike a balance in both. Pertaining directly to the strategic leadership, this means
conducting democratic elections to prevent the rise of dictatorship and to restore faith in the
community about the legitimacy of the elections. Furthermore, since Shi’ite Muslims have been
banned from political involvement through previous de facto regulations of Saddam Hussein and
Sunni Muslims stripped of their power through de-Ba’athification, it is essential that their voices
and concerns are heard. This type of justice being restored to an oppressed group will help to
establish peace durability through the elimination of grievances.
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Domestic & International Constraints
An evaluation of Iraq’s past and current state poses specific constraints, as mentioned
above, which require special strategizing. These constraints are largely temporally related.
Considering domestic constraints, there are factors such the length of time required to establish a
democracy and the lag time considered when implementation of any new policy. Furthermore,
transitioning to a democracy can be a dangerous and volatile time for a country as there is an
uprising of voices, opinions and grievances that must be accommodated by a government
(Mansfield & Snyder,1995). Additionally, when entering a democratic state, there are many
individuals who may not be aware of their stand in accordance to their political affiliations
(Mansfield & Snyder,1995). On the international scale, there is the fear of the spillover effect
which is primarily concerned with economic rehabilitation, as well as surrounding VNSA
violence (Pham & Doucouliagos, 2017).
The first consideration is the domestic constraints: the length of time required to establish
a democracy and the lag time in implementing new policy. Based upon the literature review and
the quantitative investigation, it is clear that both the establishment of democracy as well as
domestic infrastructure related policy are vital in the establishment of durable peace (Windsor,
2003). Since Iraq is formally no longer engaged in civil war, having the citizenry understand that
they are part of democracy would help to ensure durable peace since different factions have the
capability to voice their needs. However, the assurance that an established political system works
as a democracy is gained over time. Surely, upholding the most amount of transparency possible
in elections may help to increase the sense of an established democracy.
The second domestic constraint is the lag time in implementing new policy. When the
budget is expanded for both education and healthcare, there will be a delay in the amount of time

57

that the monetary expansion will have time to truly affect the current condition of citizens. For
example, while the budget for education allows for a new vision of the education program and
new resources to be distributed, this process does not occur instantaneously. The time between
the civil war ending and the new curriculum to be implemented, is extremely unstable. In this
time, there is no promise that the needs are being heard by the government and there are still
grievances that are being renewed.
On the international scale, a potential drawback to the investment in domestic
infrastructure and economic rehabilitation is the spillover effect. This is defined as the economic
effects on bilateral trade due to terrorist attacks in neighboring countries (Pham & Doucouliagos,
2017). A sample of 160 countries from 1976 until 2014 showed that there was a reduction in
$6.4 million for each additional terrorist attack (Pham & Doucouliagos, 2017). Therefore, as the
economic capabilities of the government are limited by the presence of terrorism in neighboring
countries, then the capacity of the government to ensure that there is as little possible structural
opportunity for the terrorism to expand into that country is also reduced. Thus, in order to
combat these potential losses, there must be a budget that is prepared to take on these hits. Yet,
given the economic disaster left behind by Saddam Hussein and the de-Ba’athification brought
about by the involvement of American government, there are challenges in preparing for these
losses in bilateral trade considering the presence of ISIL in neighboring Syria. In this case,
international organizations and relief funds may be able to help Iraq financially as they attempt
to restabilize and promote peace in the Middle East. Additionally, these types of organizations
may be able to assist by attempting to reduce the amount of terrorism in neighboring countries as
a larger orchestrated effort to establish peace. This would reduce the amount of pressure on Iraq
to deal with the surrounding circumstances independently, especially knowing that terrorism in
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neighboring countries can affect bilateral trade and therefore the economic well-being of the
country.
There are certainly drawbacks and true challenges to implementing a policy in favor of
domestic infrastructure support although there are many benefits. Therefore, considering these
drawbacks in advance of budgetary spending will allow for strategic planning that is more
equipped to handle potential decreases in monetary investment. Overcoming these barriers will
be an essential part to not only ensuring the peace durability of Iraq, but the long-term health of
the nation and its ability to deal with surrounding violence.
Global Implications
Iraq’s successfully transition through the end of ISIL into a stable democratic state
through long-term and more qual investment in military and domestic infrastructure would be
instrumental in shaping future policy. The above quantitative and qualitative explorations
explore that domestic infrastructure investment is not only the best solution, but an attainable
one. Seeing Iraq establish peace durability through a balance of military and domestic
infrastructure investment to address long-term grievances would be revolutionary for post-civil
war peace building. Additionally, the it would reframe the way that many non-profit
organizations provide aid to countries in need with the understanding that the time following the
end of civil war is also as important as during the war itself. Lastly, this could also reduce the
potentiality for terrorist organizations to take advantage of the structural opportunities for power
exploitation that are posed by civil war.
Conclusion
In all, the aim of this thesis was to establish that investment in domestic infrastructure in
greater or equal parts to investment in military post civil-war leads to greater likelihood of peace
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durability. In the quantitative portion, the regression models showed a clear correlation between
an increased likelihood of peace durability when there was an investment in healthcare and
education while there was a decreased likelihood of peace durability when there was an
investment in military. This type of high-level analysis helps to establish the need for further
investigation into the status quo and to look at cases in which this type of explanation may be
suitable. A look at Iraq from 2003 to present sheds light on the ways in which this thesis may be
applied to a country today. While Iraq was not the most idyllic case, it is important to understand
the world exists exterior of a spherical vacuum so external and unprecedented influences must be
considered. After looking at Iraq and the comprehensive grievances that accompanied the civil
war and violence, it was clear that the long-standing sectarian violence was a prominent
grievance that needed to be considered to ever find durability within the nation.
The discussion of grievances and the way they interact is a cornerstone as the thesis
transitions into the policy brief component. Not only is the above research valuable to
international affairs scholarship, but it may also be used to form policy that will lead to stronger
agreements which facilitate durable peace within and among countries (Fortna, 2003). Equipped
with an understanding that the civil war is driven by specific grievances, the policy brief is able
to address not how to stop violence, but how to move toward and absence of grievances in order
to create a peaceful society. Based off literature, it is clear that education and health investment
are potentials for beginning to shape a society founded on durable peace (Abu-Nimer & Nassar,
2017; Windsor, 2003). However, many of the programs which would allow for an increased
sense of domestic infrastructure, such as education reform and increased economic strength
through trade are vulnerable to drawbacks (United States Government Accountability Office,
2007). These drawbacks include the difficulty of implementing education reform because of
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unique regional needs in Iraq and the reluctance of countries to increase bilateral trade with postcivil war countries. (Abu-Nimer, & Nassar, 2017; Vreeland, 2008). These drawbacks have the
opportunity to be sidestepped through looking to international organization and neighboring state
to provide support as the country regains independence. While this is not the best-case scenario,
the recognition that this thesis has realistic goals that are able to be achieved is an important part
of the purpose of the thesis overall.
This discussion of how a civil war state may establish peace in our word today also has a
more humanitarian purpose. By discovering the narrative that has been told about civil war states
which is that civil war often produces fragile states that reengage in civil war and then using a
qualitative approach to reveal information brings new opportunities to individuals of these states.
Rather than assuming that a state is unable to achieve to peace other than through preventing the
engagement of war, my research showed that by fostering the absence of grievances, there is a
more humane approach to preventing violent outbreak. By addressing which specific grievances
motivates individuals to go to war, then one is able to address those grievances through the
specific approach as required by the unique set of people. This changes the standard of what is
expected of states who are exiting civil war. The narrative is no longer that these states are
unable to achieve peace, it is that the grievances of the people have historically not been
addressed. This shifts the responsibility of the state from being the war stopper, to the grievance
amender. The government is entity responsible to its people for providing them with their basic
needs and assuring their minimum quality of life to a level such that there are other viable
solutions to their expression other than war.
As peace studies continues to expand and become a more dynamic and interdisciplinary
field, there is a need for scholarship and research to continue in the realm of the execution of
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theories This translates to answering the question “how?” at a deeper level. For example, in the
case of this thesis, how will states be able to measure and collect information on the grievances
of their citizens? How will states be held responsible if they are not listening to their citizens?
Additionally, there is more scholarship to be developed in the discipline of justice studies. For
example, addressing if negligence of a state to address the grievances of the individuals is a form
of oppression. What are appropriate repercussions? Are other states responsible to these states in
any capacity? These philosophical and theoretical gaps in literature as proposed above would
help to create new ways of thinking about civil war as well as the relation of state and its people.
The Iraq War and rise of ISIL were two raindrops in a larger sea of violence and
bloodshed. However, a closer look at their composition revealed that perhaps many civil
conflicts share more in common than originally thought. Although each war may have a unique
and exceptional set of circumstances that surrounds it, one cannot assume that finding a single
solution to overcoming one particular civil war is equally as unique and exceptional. Rather, by
changing the narrative of what drives civil war, one is also able to change the narrative to
discover what prevents it.
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